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ABSTRACT
As neural networks make their way into safety-critical systems,
where misbehavior can lead to catastrophes, there is a growing
interest in certifying the equivalence of two structurally similar
neural networks – a problem known as differential verification.
For example, compression techniques are often used in practice for
deploying trained neural networks on computationally- and energy-
constrained devices, which raises the question of how faithfully the
compressed network mimics the original network. Unfortunately,
existing methods either focus on verifying a single network or rely
on loose approximations to prove the equivalence of two networks.
Due to overly conservative approximation, differential verification
lacks scalability in terms of both accuracy and computational cost.
To overcome these problems, we propose NeuroDiff, a symbolic
and fine-grained approximation technique that drastically increases
the accuracy of differential verification on feed-forward ReLU net-
works while achieving many orders-of-magnitude speedup. Neu-
roDiff has two key contributions. The first one is new convex
approximations that more accurately bound the difference of two
networks under all possible inputs. The second one is judicious
use of symbolic variables to represent neurons whose difference
bounds have accumulated significant error. We find that these two
techniques are complementary, i.e., when combined, the benefit is
greater than the sum of their individual benefits. We have evalu-
ated NeuroDiff on a variety of differential verification tasks. Our
results show that NeuroDiff is up to 1000X faster and 5X more
accurate than the state-of-the-art tool.
1 INTRODUCTION
There is a growing need for rigorous analysis techniques that can
compare the behaviors of two or more neural networks trained for
the same task. For example, such techniques have applications in
better understanding the representations learned by different net-
works [46], and finding inputs where networks disagree [52]. The
need is further motivated by the increasing use of neural network
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compression [14] – a technique that alters the network’s parame-
ters to reduce its energy and computational cost – where we expect
the compressed network to be functionally equivalent to the origi-
nal network. In safety-critical systems where a single instance of
misbehavior can lead to catastrophe, having formal guarantees on
the equivalence of the original and compressed networks is highly
desirable.
Unfortunately, most work aimed at verifying or testing neural
networks does not provide formal guarantees on their equivalence.
For example, testing techniques geared toward refutation can pro-
vide inputs where a single network misbehaves [22, 31, 42, 44, 51] or
multiple networks disagree [23, 34, 52], but they do not guarantee
the absence of misbehaviors or disagreements. While techniques
geared toward verification can prove safety or robustness prop-
erties of a single network [7–9, 15, 18, 25, 38, 41, 47], they lack
crucial information needed to prove the equivalence of multiple
networks. One exception is the ReluDiff tool of Paulsen et al. [33],
which computes a sound approximation of the difference of two
neural networks, a problem known as differential verification. While
ReluDiff performs better than other techniques, the overly con-
servative approximation it computes often causes both accuracy
and efficiency to suffer.
To overcome these problems, we proposeNeuroDiff, a new sym-
bolic and fine-grained approximation technique that significantly
increases the accuracy of differential verification while achieving
many orders-of-magnitude speedup. NeuroDiff has two key con-
tributions. The first contribution is the development of convex ap-
proximations, a fine-grained approximation technique for bound-
ing the output difference of neurons for all possible inputs, which
drastically improves over the coarse-grained concretizations used
by ReluDiff. The second contribution is judiciously introducing
symbolic variables to represent neurons in hidden layers whose dif-
ference bounds have accumulated significant approximation error.
These two techniques are also complementary, i.e., when combined,
the benefit is significantly greater than the sum of their individual
benefits.
The overall flow of NeuroDiff is shown in Figure 1, where it
takes as input two neural networks f and f ′, a set of inputs to the
neural networks X defined by box intervals, and a small constant ϵ
that quantifies the tolerance for disagreement. We assume that f
and f ′ have the same network topology and only differ in the
numerical values of their weights. In practice, f ′ could be the
compressed version of f , or they could be networks constructed
using the same network topology but slightly different training
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Figure 1: The overall flow of NeuroDiff.
data. We also note that this assumption can support compression
techniques such as weight pruning [14] (by setting edges’ weights
to 0) and even neuron removal [10] (by setting all of a neuron’s
incoming edge weights to 0). NeuroDiff then aims to prove ∀x ∈
X .| f ′(x) − f (x)| < ϵ . It can return (1) verified if a proof can be
found, or (2) undetermined if a specified timeout is reached.
Internally, NeuroDiff first performs a forward analysis using
symbolic interval arithmetic to bound both the absolute value
ranges of all neurons, as in single network verification, and the dif-
ference between the neurons of the two networks. NeuroDiff then
checks if the difference between the output neurons satisfies ϵ , and
if so returns verified. Otherwise, NeuroDiff uses a gradient-based
refinement to partition X into two disjoint sub regions X1 and X2,
and attempts the analysis again on the individual regions. Since X1
and X2 form independent sub-problems, we can do these analyses
in parallel, hence gaining significant speedup.
The new convex approximations used in NeuroDiff are signifi-
cantly more accurate than not only the coarse-grained concretiza-
tions in ReluDiff [33] but also the standard convex approximations
in single-network verification tools [39, 40, 47, 54]. While these
(standard) convex approximations aim to bound the absolute value
range of y = ReLU (x), where x is the input of the rectified linear
unit (ReLU) activation function, our new convex approximations
aim to bound the difference z = ReLU (x + ∆) − ReLU (x), where
x and x + ∆ are ReLU inputs of two corresponding neurons. This
is significantly more challenging because it involves the search of
bounding planes in a three-dimensional space (defined by x , ∆ and
z) as opposed to a two-dimensional space as in the prior work.
The symbolic variables we judiciously add to represent values of
neurons in hidden layers should not be confused with the symbolic
inputs used by existing tools either.While the use of symbolic inputs
is well understood, e.g., both in single-network verification [39, 40,
47, 54] and differential verification [33], this is the first time that
symbolic variables are used to substitute values of hidden neurons
during differential verification. While the impact of symbolic inputs
often diminishes after the first few layers of neurons, the impact
of these new symbolic variables, when judiciously added, can be
maintained in any hidden layer.
We have implemented the proposed NeuroDiff in a tool and
evaluated it on a large set of differential verification tasks. Our
benchmarks consists of 49 networks, from applications such as
aircraft collision avoidance, image classification, and human activity
recognition. We have experimentally compared with ReluDiff [33],
the state-of-the-art tool which has also been shown to be superior
1.9
1.1
-1.9
1.0
2.1
0.9
1.1
-1.0
1.0
-1.0
n0,1
n0,2 n1,2
n1,1 n2,1
n2,2
n3,1
x1 ∈ [−2, 2]
x2 ∈ [−2, 2]
-2.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
-1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
-1.0
Figure 2: Motivating example.
to ReluVal [48] and DeepPoly [40] for differential verification.
Our results show that NeuroDiff is up to 1,000X faster and 5X
more accurate. In addition, NeuroDiff is able to prove many of
the same properties as ReluDiff while considering much larger
input regions.
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose new convex approximations to more accurately
bound the difference between corresponding neurons of two
structurally similar neural networks.
• We propose a method for judiciously introducing symbolic
variables to neurons in hidden layers to mitigate the propa-
gation of approximation error.
• We implement and evaluate the proposed technique on a
large number of differential verification tasks and demon-
strate its significant speed and accuracy gains.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we
provide a brief overview of our method in Section 2. Then, we
provide the technical background in Section 3. Next, we present
the detailed algorithms in Section 4 and the experimental results in
Section 5. We review the related work in Section 6. Finally, we give
our conclusions in Section 7.
2 OVERVIEW
In this section, we highlight our main contributions and illustrate
the shortcomings of previous work on a motivating example.
2.1 Differential Verification
We use the neural network in Figure 2 as a running example. The
network has two input nodes n0,1,n0,2, two hidden layers with
two neurons each (n1,1,n1,2 and n2,1,n2,2), and one output node
n3,1. Each neuron in the hidden layer performs a summation of
their inputs, followed by a rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation
function, defined asy =max(0,x), where x is the input to the ReLU
activation function, and y is the output.
Let this entire network be f , and the value of the output node be
n3,1 = f (x1,x2), where x1 and x2 are the values of input nodes n0,1
and n0,2, respectively. The network can be evaluated on a specific
input by performing a series matrix multiplications (i.e., affine
transformations) followed by element-wise ReLU transformations.
For example, the output of the neurons of the first hidden layer is[
n1,1
n1,2
]
= ReLU
( [
1.9 −1.9
1.0 1.1
]
·
[
x1
x2
] )
=
[
ReLU (1.9x1 − 1.9x2)
ReLU (1.1x1 + 1.0x2)
]
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Differential verification aims to compare f to another network
f ′ that is structurally similar. For our example, f ′ is obtained by
rounding the edge weights of f to the nearest whole numbers,
a network compression technique known as weight quantization.
Thus, f ′, n′k, j and n
′
3,1 = f
′(x1,x2) are counterparts of f , nk, j and
n3,1 = f (x1,x2) for 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Our goal is to prove
that | f ′(x1,x2) − f (x1,x2)| is less than some reasonably small ϵ for
all inputs defined by the intervals x1 ∈ [−2, 2] and x2 ∈ [−2, 2]. For
ease of understanding, we show the edge weights of f in black, and
f ′ in light blue in Figure 2.
2.2 Limitations of Existing Methods
Naively, one could adapt any state-of-the-art, single-network verifi-
cation tool for our task, including DeepPoly [40] and Neurify [47].
Neurify, in particular, takes a neural network and an input region
of the network, and uses interval arithmetic [27, 48] to produce
sound symbolic lower and upper bounds for each output node. Typ-
ically, Neurify would then use the computed bounds to certify the
absence of adversarial examples [43] for the network.
However, for our task, the boundsmust be computed for both net-
works f and f ′. Then, we subtract them, and concretize to compute
lower and upper bounds on f ′(x1,x2) − f (x1,x2). In our example,
the individual bounds would be (approximately, due to rounding)
[LB(f ),UB(f )] = [−0.94x1−0.62x2−6.51, 0.71x1−2.35x2+7.98] and
[LB(f ′),UB(f ′)] = [−0.94x1−0.44x2−6.75, 0.75x1−2.25x2+8.00]
for nodes n3,1 and n′3,1, respectively. After the subtraction, we
would obtain the bounds [LB(f ′) − UB(f ),UB(f ′) − LB(f )] =
[−1.65x1 + 1.9x2 − 14.73, 1.68x1 − 1.63x2 + 14.5]. After concretiza-
tion, we would obtain the bounds [−21.83, 21.12]. Unfortunately,
the bounds are far from being accurate.
The ReluDiff method of Paulsen et al. [33] showed that, by
directly computing a difference interval layer-by-layer, the accuracy
can be greatly improved. For the running example, ReluDiffwould
first compute bounds on the difference between the neurons n1,1
andn′1,1, which is [0, 1.1], and then similarly compute bounds on the
difference between outputs of n1,2 and n′1,2. Then, the results would
be used to compute difference bounds of the subsequent layer. The
reason it is more accurate is because it begins computing part of
the difference bound before errors have accumulated, whereas the
naive approach first accumulates significant errors at each neuron,
and then computes the difference bound. In our running example,
ReluDiff [33] would compute the tighter bounds [−3.1101, 2.5600].
While ReluDiff improves over the naive approach, in many
cases, it uses concrete values for the upper and lower bounds. In prac-
tice, this approach can suffer from severe error-explosion. Specifi-
cally, whenever a neuron of either network is in an unstable state –
i.e., when a ReLU’s input interval contains the value 0 – it has to
concretize the symbolic expressions.
2.3 Our Method
The key contribution in NeuroDiff, our new method, is a symbolic
and fine-grained approximation technique that both reduces the
approximation error introduced when a neuron is in an unstable
state, and mitigates the explosion of such approximation error after
it is introduced.
2.3.1 Convex Approximation for the Difference Interval. Our first
contribution is developing convex approximations to directly bound
the difference between two neurons after these ReLU activations.
Specifically, for a neuron n in f and corresponding neuron n′ in f ′,
we want to bound the value of ReLU (n′) − ReLU (n). We illustrate
the various choices using Figures 3, 4, and 5.
The naive way to bound this difference is to first compute ap-
proximations of y = ReLU (n) and y′ = ReLU (n′) separately, and
then subtract them. Since each of these functions has a single vari-
able, convex approximation is simple and is already used by single-
network verification tools [40, 47, 49]. Figure 6 shows the function
y = ReLU (n) and its bounding planes (shown as dashed-lines) in
a two-dimensional space (details in Section 3). However, as we
have already mentioned, approximation errors would be accumu-
lated in the bounds of ReLU (n) and ReLU (n′) and then amplified by
the interval subtraction. This is precisely why the naive approach
performs poorly.
The ReluDiff method of Paulsen et al. [33] improves upon the
new approximation by computing an interval bound on n′ − n, de-
noted ∆, then rewriting z = ReLU (n′) − ReLU (n) as z = ReLU (n +
∆) − ReLU (n), and finally bounding this new function instead. Fig-
ure 3 shows the shape of z = ReLU (n + ∆) − ReLU (n) in a three-
dimensional space. Note that it has four piece-wise linear subre-
gions, defined by values of the input variables n and ∆. While the
bounds computed by ReluDiff [33], shown as the (horizontal)
yellow planes in Figure 4, are sound, in practice they tend to be
loose because the upper and lower bounds are both concrete values.
Such eager concretization eliminates symbolic information that ∆
contained before applying the ReLU activation.
In contrast, our method computes a convex approximation of z,
shown by the (tilted) yellow planes in Figure 5. Since these tilted
bounding planes are in a three-dimensional space, they are sig-
nificantly more challenging to compute than the standard two-
dimensional convex approximations (shown in Figure 6) used by
single network verification tools. Our approximations have the
advantage of introducing significantly less error than the horizon-
tal planes used in ReluDiff [33], while maintaining some of the
symbolic information for ∆ before applying the ReLU activation.
We will show through experimental evaluation (Section 5) that
our convex approximation can drastically improve the accuracy of
the difference bounds, and are particularly effective when the input
region being considered is large. Furthermore, the tilted planes
shown in Figure 5 are for the general case. For certain special cases,
we obtain even tighter bounding planes (details in Section 4). In
the running example, using our new convex approximations would
improve the final bounds to [−1.97, 1.42].
2.3.2 Symbolic Variables for Hidden Neurons. Our second contri-
bution is introducing symbolic variables to represent the output
values of some unstable neurons, with the goal of limiting the prop-
agation of approximation errors after they are introduced. In the
running example, since both n1,1 and n′1,1 are in unstable states,
i.e., the input intervals of the ReLUs contain the value 0, we may
introduce a new symbol x3 = ReLU (n′1,1) − ReLU (n1,1). In all sub-
sequent layers, whenever the value of ReLU (n′1,1) − ReLU (n1,1) is
needed, we use the bounds [x3,x3] instead of the actual bounds.
3
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Figure 3: The shape of z = ReLU (n + ∆) − ReLU (n). Figure 4: Bounding planes computed by ReluDiff [33].
Figure 5: Bounding planes computed by our newmethod.
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Figure 6: Bounding planes computed by Neurify [47].
The reason why using x3 can lead to more accurate results is
because, even though our convex approximations reduce the error
introduced, there is inevitably some error that accumulates. Intro-
ducing x3 allows this error to partially cancel in the subsequent
layers. In our running example, introducing the new symbolic vari-
able x3 would be able to improve the final bounds to [−1.65, 1.18].
While creating x3 improved the result in this case, carelessly
introducing new variables for all the unstable neurons can actually
reduce the overall benefit (see Section 4). In addition, the computa-
tional cost of introducing new variables is not negligible. Therefore,
in practice, we must introduce these symbolic variables judiciously,
to maximize the benefit. Part of our contribution in NeuroDiff is
in developing heuristics to automatically determine when to create
new symbolic variables (details in Section 4).
3 BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the technical background and then intro-
duce notations that we use throughout the paper.
3.1 Neural Networks
We focus on feed-forward neural networks, which we define as a
function f that takes an n-dimensional vector of real values x ∈ X,
where X ⊆ Rn , and maps it to an m-dimensional vector y ∈ Y,
where Y ⊆ Rm . We denote this function as f : X→ Y. Typically,
each dimension of y represents a score, such as a probability, that
the input x belongs to class i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
A network with l layers has l weight matrices, each of which
is denotedWk , for 1 ≤ k ≤ l . For each weight matrix, we have
Wk ∈ Rlk−1×lk where lk−1 is the number of neurons in layer (k − 1)
and likewise for lk , and l0 = n. Each element inWk represents the
weight of an edge from a neuron in layer (k − 1) to one in layer
k . Let nk, j denote the jth neuron of layer k , and nk−1,i denote
the ith neuron of layer (k − 1). We useWk [i, j] to denote the edge
weight from nk−1,i to nk, j . In our motivating example, we have
W1[1, 1] = 1.9 andW1[1, 2] = 1.1.
Mathematically, the entire neural network can be represented
by f (x) = fl (Wl · fl−1(Wl−1 · ... f1(W1 · x)...)), where fk is the
activation function of the kth layer and 1 ≤ k ≤ l . We focus on
neural networks with ReLU activations because they are the most
widely implemented in practice, but our method can be extended
to other activation functions, such as siдmoid and tanh, and other
layer types, such as convolutional and max-pooling. We leave this
as future work.
3.2 Symbolic Intervals
To compute approximations of the output nodes that are sound for
all input values, we leverage interval arithmetic [27], which can be
viewed as an instance of the abstract interpretation framework [5].
It is well-suited to the verification task because interval arithmetic
4
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is soundly defined for basic operations of the network such as
addition, subtraction, and scaling.
Let I = [LB(I ),UB(I )] be an interval with lower bound LB(I ) and
upper bound UB(I ). Then, for intervals I1, I2, we have addition and
subtraction defined as I1 + I2 = [LB(I1) + LB(I2),UB(I1) + UB(I2)]
and I1 − I2 = [LB(I1) − UB(I2),UB(I1) − LB(I2)], respectively. For
a constant c , scaling is defined as c × I1 = [c × LB(I1), c × UB(I1)
when c > 0, and c × I1 = [c × UB(I1), c × LB(I1)] otherwise.
While interval arithmetic is a sound over-approximation, it is
not always accurate. To illustrate, let f (x) = 3x − x , and say we
are interested in bounding f (x) when x ∈ [−1, 1]. One way to
bound f is by evaluating f (I ) where I = [−1, 1]. Doing so yields
3 × [−1, 1] − [−1, 1] = [−4, 4]. Unfortunately, the most accurate
bounds are [−2, 2].
There are (at least) two ways we can improve the accuracy. First,
we can soundly refine the result by dividing the input intervals
into disjoint partitions, performing the analysis independently on
each partition, and then unioning the resulting output intervals
together. Previous work has shown the result will be at least as
precise [48], and often better. For example, if we partitionx ∈ [−1, 1]
into x ∈ [−1, 0] and x ∈ [0, 1], and perform the analysis for each
partition, the resulting bounds improve to [−3, 3].
Second, the dependence between the two intervals are not lever-
aged when we subtract them, i.e., that they were both x terms and
hence could partially cancel out. To capture the dependence, we
can use symbolic lower and upper bounds [48], which are expres-
sions in terms of the input variable, i.e., I = [x ,x]. Evaluating f (I )
then yields the interval If = [2x , 2x], for x ∈ [−1, 1]. When using
symbolic bounds, eventually, we must concretize the lower and
upper bound equations. We denote concretization of LB(If ) = 2x
and UB(If ) = 2x as LB(If ) = −2 and UB(If ) = 2, respectively.
Compared to the naive solution, [−4, 4], this is a significant im-
provement.
When approximating the output of a given function f : X→ Y
over an input intervalX ⊆ X, one may prove soundness by showing
that the evaluation of the lower and upper bounds on any input
x ∈ X are always greater than and less than, respectively, to the
true value of f (x). Formally, for an interval I , let LB(I )(x) be the
evaluation of the lower bound equation on input x , and similarly for
UB(I )(x). Then, the approximation is considered sound if ∀x ∈ X ,
we have LB(I )(x) ≤ f (x) ≤ UB(I )(x).
3.3 Convex Approximations
While symbolic intervals are exact for linear operations (i.e. they do
not introduce error), this is not the case for non-linear operations,
such as the ReLU activation. This is because, for efficiency reasons,
the symbolic lower and upper bounds must be kept linear. Thus, de-
veloping linear approximations for non-linear activation functions
has become a signifciant area of research for single neural network
verification [40, 47, 49, 54]. We review the basics below, but caution
that they are different from our new convex approximations in
NeuroDiff.
We denote the input to the ReLU of a neuronnk, j as Sin (nk, j ) and
the output as S(nk, j ). The approach used by existing single-network
verification tools is to apply an affine transformation to the upper
bound of Sin (nk, j ) such that UB(Sin (nk, j ))(x) ≥ 0, where x ∈ X ,
and X is the input region for the entire network. For the lower
bound, there exist several possible transformations, including the
one used by Neurify [47], shown in Figure 6, where n = Sin (nk, j )
and the dashed lines are the upper and lower bounds.
We illustrate the upper bound transformation forn1,1 of ourmoti-
vating example. After computing the upper bound of the ReLU input
UB(Sin (n1,1)) = 1.9x1 − 1.9x2, where x1 ∈ [−2, 2] and x2 ∈ [−2, 2],
it computes the concrete lower and upper bounds. We denote these
as UB(Sin (n1,1)) = −7.6 and UB(Sin (n1,1)) = 7.6. We refer to them
as l and u, respectively, for short hand. Then, it computes the line
that passes through (u,u) and (0, l). Letting y = UB(Sin (n1,1))
be the upper bound equation of the ReLU input, it computes the
upper bound of the ReLU output as UB(S(n1,1)) = uu−l (y − l) =
0.95x1 − 0.95x2 + 3.81.
When considering a single ReLU of a single network, convex
approximation is simple because there are only three states that
the neuron can be in, namely active, inactive, and unstable. Fur-
thermore, in only one of these states, convex approximation is
needed. In contrast, differential verification has to consider a pair
of neurons, which has up to nine states to consider between the
two ReLUs. Furthermore, different states may result in different lin-
ear approximations, and some states can even have multiple linear
approximations depending on the difference bound of ∆ = n′ − n.
As we will show in Section 4, there are significantly more consider-
ations in our problem domain.
4 OUR APPROACH
We first present our baseline procedure for differential verification
of feed-forward neural networks (Section 4.1), and then present our
algorithms for computing convex approximations (Section 4.3) and
introducing symbolic variables (Section 4.4).
4.1 Differential Verification – Baseline
We build off the work of Paulsen et al. [33], so in this section we
review the relevant pieces. We assume that the input to NeuroD-
iff consists of two networks f and f ′, each with l layers of the
same size. Let n′k, j in f
′ be the neuron paired with nk, j in f . This
implicitly creates a pairing of the edge weights between the two
networks. We first introduce additional notation.
• We denote the difference between a pair of neurons as ∆k, j =
n′k, j − nk, j . For example, ∆1,1 = 0.1 under the input x1 =
2,x2 = 1 in our motivating example shown in Figure 2.
• Wedenote the difference in a pair of edgeweights asW ∆k [i, j] =
W ′k [i, j] −Wk [i, j]. For example,W ∆1 [1, 1] = 2.0 − 1.9 = 0.1.• We extend the symbolic interval notation to these terms.
That is, Sin (∆k, j ) denotes the interval that boundsn′k, j−nk, j
before applying ReLU, and S(∆k, j ) denotes the interval after
applying ReLU.
Given that we have computed S(nk−1,i ), S(n′k−1,i ), S(∆k−1,i ) for
every neuron in the layer k − 1, now, we compute a single S(∆k, j )
in the subsequent layer k in two steps (and then repeat for each
1 ≤ j ≤ lk ).
First, we compute Sin (∆k, j ) by propagating the output intervals
from the previous layer through the edges connecting to the target
5
ASE ’20, September 21–25, 2020, Virtual Event, Australia Brandon Paulsen, Jingbo Wang, Jiawei Wang, and Chao Wang
(x − l)u−l ′u−l + l ′
(x − u)u′−lu−l + u ′
l
u
Figure 7: Illustration of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2.
neuron. This is defined as
Sin (∆k, j ) =
∑
i
(
S(∆k−1,i ) ×W ′k [i, j] + S(nk−1,i ) ×W ∆k−1[i, j]
)
We illustrate this computation on node ∆1,1 in our example. First,
we initialize S(∆0,1) = [0, 0] , S(∆0,2) = [0, 0]. Then we compute
Sin (∆1,1) = [0, 0]×2.0+[x1,x1]×0.1+[0, 0]×−2.0+ [x2,x2]×−0.1 =
[0.1x1 − 0.1x2, 0.1x1 − 0.1x2].
For the second step, we apply ReLU to Sin (∆k, j ) to obtain S(∆k, j ).
This is where we apply the new convex approximations (Section 4.3)
to obtain tighter bounds. Toward this end, we will focus on the
following two equations:
z1 = ReLU (nk, j + ∆k, j ) − ReLU (nk, j ) (1)
z2 = ReLU (n′k, j ) − ReLU (n′k, j − ∆k, j ) (2)
While Paulsen et al. [33] also compute bounds of these two equa-
tions, they use concretizations instead of linear approximations, thus
throwing away all the symbolic information. For the running exam-
ple, their method would result in the bounds of S(∆1,1) = [−.4, .4].
In contrast, our method will be able to maintain some or all of the
symbolic information, thus improving the accuracy.
4.2 Two Useful Lemmas
Before presenting our new linear approximations, we introduce
two useful lemmas, which will simplify our presentation as well as
our soundness proofs.
Lemma 4.1. Let x be a variable such that l ≤ x ≤ u for constants
l ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ u. For a constant l ′ such that l ≤ l ′ ≤ 0, we have
x ≤ (x − l) ∗ u−l ′u−l + l ′ ≥ l ′.
Lemma 4.2. Let x be a variable such that l ≤ x ≤ u for constants
l ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ u. For a constant u ′ such that 0 ≤ u ′ ≤ u, we have
u ′ ≥ (x − u) ∗ u′−lu−l + u ′ ≤ x .
We illustrate these lemmas in Figure 7. The solid blue line shows
the equation y = x for the input interval l ≤ x ≤ u. The upper
dashed line illustrates the transformation of Lemma 4.1, and the
lower dashed line illustrates Lemma 4.2. Specifically, Lemma 4.1
shows a transformation applied to x whose result is always greater
than both l ′ and x . Similarly, Lemma 4.2 shows a transformation
applied to x whose result is always less than both u ′ and x . These
lemmas will be useful in bounding Equations 1 and 2.
4.3 New Convex Approximations for S(∆k, j )
Now, we are ready to present our new approximations, which are
linear symbolic expressions derived from Equations 1 and 2.
We first assume that nk, j and n′k, j could both be unstable, i.e.,
they could take values both greater than and less than 0. This yields
bounds for the general case in that they are sound in all states ofnk, j
and n′k, j (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Then, we consider special cases
of nk, j and n′k, j , in which even tighter upper and lower bounds are
derived (Section 4.3.3).
To simplify notation, we let n,n′, and ∆ stand in for nk, j ,n′k, j ,
and ∆k, j in the remainder of this section.
4.3.1 Upper Bound for the General Case. Let l = UB(Sin (∆)) and
u = UB(Sin (∆)). The upper bound approximation is:
UB(S(∆)) =

UB(Sin (∆)) UB(Sin (∆)) ≥ 0
0 UB(Sin (∆)) ≤ 0
(UB(Sin (∆)) − l) ∗ uu−l otherwise
That is, when the input’s (delta) upper bound is greater than 0 for all
x ∈ X , we can use the input’s upper bound unchanged. When the
upper bound is always less than 0, the new output’s upper bound
is then 0. Otherwise, we apply a linear transformation to the upper
bound, which results in the upper plane illustrated in Figure 5. We
prove all three cases sound.
Proof. We consider each case above separately. In the following,
we use Equation 1 to derive the bounds, but we note a symmetric
proof using Equation 2 exists and produces the same bounds.
Case 1: UB(Sin (∆)) ≥ 0. We first show that, according to Equa-
tion 1, when 0 ≤ ∆ we have z1 ≤ ∆. This then implies that, if
UB(Sin (∆)) ≥ 0, then z1 ≤ UB(Sin (∆))(x) for all x ∈ X , and hence
it is a valid upper bound for the output interval.
Assume 0 ≤ ∆. We consider two cases of n. First, consider 0 ≤ n.
Observe 0 ≤ n ∧ 0 ≤ ∆ =⇒ 0 ≤ n + ∆. Thus, the ReLU’s of
Equation 1 simplify to z1 = n + ∆ − n = ∆ =⇒ z1 ≤ ∆. When
n < 0, Equation 1 simplifies to z1 = ReLU (n + ∆). Since n < 0,
we have n + ∆ ≤ ∆ ∧ 0 ≤ ∆ =⇒ ReLU (n + ∆) ≤ ∆. Thus,
z1 = ReLU (n + ∆) ≤ ∆, so the approximation is sound.
Case 2: UB(Sin (∆)) ≤ 0. This case was previously proven [33],
but we restate it here. UB(Sin (∆)) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ n′ ≤ n =⇒
ReLU (n′) ≤ ReLU (n) ⇐⇒ ReLU (n′) − ReLU (n) ≤ 0.
Case 3. By case 1, any UB(S(∆)) that satisfies UB(S(∆))(x) ≥ 0
and UB(S(∆))(x) ≥ UB(Sin (∆))(x) for all x ∈ X is sound. Both in-
equalities hold by Lemma 4.1, withx = UB(Sin (∆)), l = UB(Sin (∆)),
u = UB(Sin (∆)) and l ′ = 0.
□
We illustrate the upper bound computation on node n1,1 of our
motivating example. Recall that UB(Sin (n1,1)) = 0.1x1 − 0.1x2.
Since UB(Sin (n1,1)) = −0.4 and UB(Sin (n1,1)) = 0.4, we are in
the third case of our linear approximation above. Thus, we have
UB(Sin (n1,1)) =(0.1x1−0.1x2−(−0.4))∗ 0.40.4−(−0.4) =0.5x1−0.5x2+
0.2. This is the upper bounding plane illustrated in Figure 5. The
volume under this plane is 50% less than the upper bounding plane
of ReluDiff shown in Figure 4.
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4.3.2 Lower Bound for the General Case. Let l = LB(Sin (∆)) and
u = LB(Sin (∆)), the lower bound approximation is:
LB(S(∆)) =

LB(Sin (∆)) LB(Sin (∆)) ≤ 0
0 LB(Sin (∆)) ≥ 0
(LB(Sin (∆)) − u) ∗ −lu−l otherwise
That is, when the input lower bound is always less than 0, we can
leave it unchanged. When it is always greater than 0, the new lower
bound is then 0. Otherwise, we apply a transformation to the lower
bound, which results in the lower plane illustrated in Figure 5. We
prove all three cases sound.
Proof. We consider each case above separately. In the following,
we use Equation 1 to derive the bounds, but we note a symmetric
proof using Equation 2 exists and produces the same bounds.
Case 1: LB(Sin (∆)) ≤ 0. We first show that according to Equa-
tion 1, when ∆ ≤ 0 we have ∆ ≤ z1. This then implies that, if
LB(Sin (∆)) ≤ 0, we have LB(Sin (∆))(x) ≤ z1 for all x ∈ X , and
hence it is a valid lower bound for the output interval.
Assume ∆ ≤ 0. We consider two cases of n + ∆. First, let 0 ≤
n + ∆. Observe 0 ≤ n + ∆ ∧ ∆ ≤ 0 =⇒ 0 ≤ n, so we can
simplify Equation 1 to z1 = n + ∆ − n = ∆ =⇒ ∆ ≤ z1. Second,
let n + ∆ < 0 ⇐⇒ ∆ < −n. Then, Equation 1 simplifies to
z1 = −ReLU (n) = −max(0,n) = min(0,−n). Now observe ∆ <
−n ∧ ∆ < 0 =⇒ ∆ < min(0,−n) = z1.
Case 2: LB(Sin (∆)) ≥ 0. This case was previously proven sound
[33], but we restate it here. LB(Sin (∆)) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ n′ ≥ n =⇒
ReLU (n′) ≥ ReLU (n) ⇐⇒ ReLU (n′) − ReLU (n) ≥ 0.
Case 3. By case 1, any LB(S(∆)) that satisfies LB(S(∆))(x) ≤ 0
and LB(S(∆))(x) ≤ LB(Sin (∆))(x) for all x ∈ X will be valid. Both
inequalities hold by Lemma 4.2, with x = LB(Sin (∆)),u ′ = 0, l =
LB(Sin (∆)), and u = LB(Sin (∆)).
□
We illustrate the lower bound computation on node n1,1 of our
motivating example. Recall that LB(Sin (n1,1)) = 0.1x1−0.1x2. Since
LB(Sin (n1,1)) = −0.4 and LB(Sin (n1,1)) = 0.4, we are in the third
case of our linear approximation. Thus, we have LB(S(n1,1)) =
(0.1x1 − 0.1x2 − (−0.4)) ∗ −(−0.4)0.4−(−0.4)= 0.05x1 − 0.05x2 − 0.2. This is
the lower bounding plane illustrated in Figure 5. The volume above
this plane is 50% less than the lower bounding plane of ReluDiff
shown in Figure 4.
4.3.3 Tighter Bounds for Special Cases. While the bounds pre-
sented so far apply in all states of n and n′, under certain con-
ditions, we are able to tighten these bounds even further. Toward
this end, we restate the following two lemmas proved by Paulsen
et al. [33], which will come in handy. They are related to properties
of Equations 1 and 2, respectively.
Lemma 4.3. ReLU (n + ∆) − n ≡max(−n,∆)
Lemma 4.4. n′ − ReLU (n′ − ∆) ≡min(n′,∆)
These lemmas provide bounds when n and n′ are proved to be
linear based on the absolute bounds that we compute.
Figure 8: Tighter upper bounding plane.
Figure 9: Tighter lower bounding plane.
Tighter Upper Bound When n′ Is Linear. In this case, we have
UB(S(∆)) = UB(Sin (∆)), which is an improvement for the second
or third case of our general upper bound.
Proof. By our case assumption, Equation 2 simplifies to the one
in Lemma 4.4. Thus, z2 =min(n′,∆) =⇒ z2 ≤ ∆. □
Tighter Upper BoundWhenn Is Linear,UB(Sin (∆)) ≤ −LB(Sin (n))
≤ UB(Sin (∆)). We illustrate the z1 plane under these constraints
in Figure 8. Let l = UB(Sin (∆)), and let u = UB(Sin (∆)), and l ′ =
−LB(Sin (n)), we use Lemma 4.1 to deriveUB(S(∆)) = (UB(Sin (∆))−
l)∗u−l ′u−l +l ′. This results in the upper plane of Figure 8. This improves
over the third case in our general upper bound because it allows
the lower bound of UB(S(∆)) to be less than 0.
Proof. By our case assumption, Equation 1 simplifies to the one
in Lemma 4.3. By Lemma 4.1, we have for all x ∈ X , UB(S(∆))(x) ≥
−LB(Sin (n)) andUB(S(∆))(x) ≥ UB(Sin (∆))(x). These two inequal-
ities imply UB(S(∆)) ≥ max(−n,∆). □
Tighter Lower Bound When n Is Linear. Here, we can use the
approximation LB(S(∆)) = LB(Sin (∆)). This improves over the
second and third cases of our general lower bound.
Proof. By our case assumption, Equation 1 simplifies to the one
in Lemma 4.3. Thus, z1 =max(−n,∆) =⇒ z1 ≥ ∆. □
Tighter Lower Bound when n′ is Linear, LB(Sin (∆)) ≤ LB(Sin (n′))
≤ LB(Sin (∆)). We illustrate the z2 plane under these constraints
in Figure 9. Here, letting l = LB(Sin (∆)), u = LB(Sin (∆)), and u ′ =
LB(Sin (n′)), we can use Lemma 4.2 to derive the approximation
LB(S(∆)) = (LB(Sin (∆)) − u) ∗ u−l ′u−l + u ′. This results in the lower
plane of Figure 9. This improves over the third case, since it allows
the upper bound to be greater than 0.
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Proof. By our case assumption, Equation 2 simplifies to the
one shown in Lemma 4.4. By Lemma 4.2, we have for all x ∈
X , LB(S(∆))(x) ≤ LB(Sin (∆))(x) and LB(S(∆))(x) ≤ LB(Sin (n′)).
These two inequalities imply LB(S(∆))(x) ≤ min(n′,∆). □
4.4 Intermediate Symbolic Variables for S(∆)
While convex approximations reduce the error introduced by ReLU,
even small errors tend to be amplified significantly after a few
layers. To combat the error explosion, we introduce new symbolic
terms to represent the output values of unstable neurons, which
allow their accumulated errors to cancel out.
We illustrate the impact of symbolic variables on n1,1 of our
motivating example. Recall we have S(∆1,1) =[0.05x1−0.05x2−0.2,
0.05x1−0.05x2+0.2]. After applying the convex approximation, we
introduce a new variable x3 such that x3 = [0.05x1 − 0.05x2 − 0.2,
0.05x1−0.05x2+0.2]. Then we set S(∆1,1) = [x3,x3], and propagate
this interval as before. After propagating through n2,1 and n2,2 and
combining them at n3,1, the x3 terms partially cancel out, resulting
in the tighter final output interval [−1.65, 1.18].
In principle, symbolic variables may be introduced at any unsta-
ble neurons that introduce approximation errors, however there
are efficiency vs. accuracy tradeoffs when introducing these sym-
bolic variables. One consideration is how to deal with intermediate
variables referencing other intermediate variables. For example,
if we decide to introduce a variable x4 for n2,1, then x4 will have
an x3 term in its equation. Then, when we are evaluating a sym-
bolic bound that contains an x4 term, which will be the case for
n3,1, we will have to recursively substitute the bounds of the pre-
vious intermediate variables, such as x3. This becomes expensive,
especially when it is used together with our bisection-based refine-
ment [33, 48]. Thus, in practice, we first remove any back-references
to intermediate variables by substituting in their lower bounds and
upper bounds into the new intermediate variable’s lower and upper
bounds, respectively.
Given that we do not allow back-references, there are two ad-
ditional considerations. First, we must consider that introducing
a new intermediate variable wipes out all the other intermediate
variables. For example, introducing a new variable at n2,1 wipes
out references to x3, thus preventing any x3 terms from canceling
at n3,1. Second, the runtime cost of introducing symbolic variables
is not negligible. The bulk of computation time in NeuroDiff is
spent multiplying the network’s weight matrices by the neuron’s
symbolic bound equations, which is implemented using matrix mul-
tiplication. Since adding variables increases the matrix size, this
increases the matrix multiplication cost.
Based on these considerations, we have developed heuristics for
adding new variables judiciously. First, since the errors introduced
by unstable neurons in the earliest layers are the most prone to
explode, and hence benefit the most when we create variables for
them, we rank them higher when choosing where to add symbolic
variables. Second, we bound the total number of symbolic variables
that may be added, since our experience shows that introducing
symbolic variables for the earliest N unstable neurons gives drastic
improvements in both run time and accuracy. In practice, N is set
to a number proportional to the weighted sum of unstable neurons
in all layers. Formally, N = ΣLk=1γ
k × Nk , where Nk is the number
of unstable neurons in layer k and γk = 1k is the discount factor.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented NeuroDiff and compared it with ReluD-
iff [33], the state-of-the-art tool for differential verification of
neural networks. NeuroDiff builds upon the codebase of ReluD-
iff [32], which was also used by single-network verification tools
such as ReluVal [48] and Neurify [47]. All use OpenBLAS [55] to
optimize the symbolic interval arithmetic (namely in applying the
weight matrices to the symbolic intervals). We note thatNeuroDiff
uses the algorithm from Neurify to compute S(nk, j ) and S(n′k, j ),
whereas ReluDiff uses the algorithm of ReluVal. SinceNeurify is
known to compute tighter bounds than ReluVal [47], we compare
to both ReluDiff, and an upgraded version of ReluDiff which
uses the bounds from Neurify to ensure that any performance gain
is due to our optimizations and not due to using Neurify’s bounds.
We use the name ReluDiff+ to refer to ReluDiff upgraded with
Neurify’s bounds.
5.1 Benchmarks
Our benchmarks consist of the 49 feed-forward neural networks
used by Paulsen et al. [33], taken from three applications: aircraft
collision avoidance, image classification, and human activity recog-
nition. We briefly describe them here. As in Paulsen et al. [33], the
second network f ′ is generated by truncating the edge weights of
f from 32 bit to 16 bit floats.
ACAS Xu [16]. ACAS (aircraft collision avoidance system) Xu
is a set of forty-five neural networks, each with five inputs, six
hidden layers of 50 units each, and five outputs, designed to advise
a pilot (the ownship) how to steer an aircraft in the presence of an
intruder aircraft. The inputs describe the position and speed of the
intruder relative to the ownship, and the outputs represent scores
for different actions that the ownship should take. The scores range
from [−0.5, 0.5]. We use the input regions defined by the properties
of previous work [17, 48].
MNIST [21]. MNIST is a standard image classification task, where
the goal is to correctly classify 28 × 28 pixel greyscale images of
handwritten digits. Neural networks trained for this task take 784
inputs (one for each pixel) each in the range [0, 255], and compute
ten outputs – one score for each of the ten possible digits. We use
three networks of size 3x100 (three hidden layers of 100 neurons
each), 2x512, and 4x1024 taken from Weng et al. [49] and Wang et
al.[47]. All achieve at least 95% accuracy on holdout test data.
Human Activity Recognition (HAR) [1]. The goal for this task
is to classify the current activity of human (e.g. walking, sitting,
laying down) based on statistics from a smartphone’s gyroscopic
sensors. Networks trained on this task take 561 statistics computed
from the sensors and output six scores for six different activities.
We use a 1x500 network.
5.2 Experimental Setup
Our experiments aim to answer the following research questions:
(1) Is NeuroDiff significantly faster than state-of-the-art?
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Figure 10: Comparing the execution times of NeuroDiff
and ReluDiff+ on all verification tasks.
(2) Is NeuroDiff’s forward pass significantly more accurate?
(3) Can NeuroDiff handle significantly larger input regions?
(4) How much does each technique contribute to the overall
improvement?
To answer these questions, we run both NeuroDiff and ReluD-
iff/ReluDiff+ on all benchmarks and compare their results. Both
NeuroDiff and ReluDiff/ReluDiff+ can be parallelized to use
multithreading, so we configure a maximum of 12 threads for all
experiments. Our experiments are run on a computer with an AMD
Ryzen Threadripper 2950X 16-core processor, with a 30-minute
timeout per differential verification task.
While we could try and adapt a single-network verification tool
to our task as done previously [33], we note that ReluDiff has been
shown to significantly outperform (by several orders of magnitude)
this naive approach.
5.3 Results
In the remainder of this section, we present our experimental results
in two steps. First, we present the overall verification results on all
benchmarks. Then, we focus on the detailed verification results on
the more difficult verification tasks.
5.3.1 Summary of Results on All Benchmarks. Our experimental
results show that, on all benchmarks, the improved ReluDiff+
slightly but consistently outperforms the original ReluDiff due to
its use of the more accurate component from Neurify instead of
ReluVal for bounding the absolute values of individual neurons.
Thus, to save space, we will only show the results that compare
NeuroDiff (our method) and ReluDiff+.
We summarize the comparison between NeuroDiff and ReluD-
iff+ using a scatter plot in Figure 10, where each point represents
a differential verification task: the x-axis is the execution time of
NeuroDiff in seconds, and the y-axis the execution time of ReluD-
iff+ in seconds. Thus, points on the diagonal line are ties, while
points above the diagonal line are wins for NeuroDiff.
The results show that NeuroDiff outperformed ReluDiff+ for
most verification tasks. Since the execution time is in logrithmic
scale the speedups of NeuroDiff are more than 1000X for many
of these verification tasks. While there are cases where NeuroDiff
is slower than ReluDiff+, due to the overhead of adding symbolic
variables, the differences are on the order of seconds. Since they
Table 1: Results for ACAS networks with ϵ = 0.05.
Property NeuroDiff (new) ReluDiff+ Speedupproved undet. time (s) proved undet. time (s)
φ1 45 0 522.6 44 1 4800.6 9.2
φ3 42 0 2.3 42 0 4.1 1.8
φ4 42 0 1.7 42 0 2.8 1.7
φ5 1 0 0.2 1 0 0.2 1.4
φ6 2 0 0.6 2 0 0.4 0.7
φ7 1 0 1404.4 0 1 1800.0 1.3
φ8 1 0 132.2 1 0 361.8 2.7
φ9 1 0 0.6 1 0 2.3 3.7
φ10 1 0 0.9 1 0 0.7 0.8
φ11 1 0 0.2 1 0 0.3 1.6
φ12 1 0 2.8 1 0 360.9 129.4
φ13 1 0 5.8 1 0 5.1 0.9
φ14 2 0 0.5 2 0 95.9 196.2
φ15 2 0 0.6 2 0 65.0 113.2
Table 2: Results for ACAS networks with ϵ = 0.01.
Property NeuroDiff (new) ReluDiff+ Speedupproved undet. time (s) proved undet. time (s)
φ1 41 4 11400.1 15 30 55778.6 4.9
φ3 42 0 14.3 35 7 13642.2 957.2
φ4 42 0 3.8 37 5 9115.0 2390.1
φ5 1 0 0.3 0 1 1800.0 5520.5
φ16 2 0 1.0 2 0 0.8 0.8
φ7 0 1 1800.0 0 1 1800.0 1.0
φ8 1 0 1115.9 0 1 1800.0 1.6
φ9 1 0 2.4 0 1 1800.0 738.2
φ10 1 0 1.6 1 0 1.1 0.7
φ11 1 0 0.3 0 1 1800.0 5673.8
φ12 1 0 132.2 0 1 1800.0 13.6
φ13 1 0 15.9 1 0 14.8 0.9
φ14 2 0 1589.3 0 2 3600.0 2.3
φ15 2 0 579.4 0 2 3600.0 6.2
are all on the small MNIST networks and the HAR network that
are very easy for both tools, we omit an in-depth analysis of them.
In the remainder of this section, we present an in-depth analysis
of the more difficult verification tasks.
5.3.2 Results on ACAS Networks. For ACAS networks, we consider
two different sets of properties, namely the original properties from
Paulsen et al. [33] where ϵ = 0.05, and the same properties but with
ϵ = 0.01. We emphasize that, while verifying ϵ = 0.05 is useful, this
means that the output value can vary by up to 10%. Considering
ϵ = 0.01 means that the output value can vary by up to 2%, which
is much more useful.
Our results are shown in Tables 1 and 2, where the first column
shows the property, which defines the input space considered. The
next three columns show the results forNeuroDiff, specifically the
number of verified networks (out of the 45 networks), the number
of unverified networks, and the total run time across all networks.
The next three show the same results, but for ReluDiff+. The final
column shows the average speed up of NeuroDiff.
The results show that NeuroDiff makes significant gains in
both speed and accuracy. Specifically, the speedups are up to two
and three orders of magnitude for ϵ = 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. In
addition, at the more accurate ϵ = 0.01 level, NeuroDiff is able to
complete 53 more verification tasks, out of the total 142 verification
tasks.
9
ASE ’20, September 21–25, 2020, Virtual Event, Australia Brandon Paulsen, Jingbo Wang, Jiawei Wang, and Chao Wang
Figure 11: Percentage of verification tasks completed on
the MNIST 4x1024 network for various perturbations.
Figure 12:Accuracy comparison for a single forward pass
on the MNIST 4x1024 network with perturbation of 8.
5.3.3 Results on MNIST Networks. For MNIST, we focus on the
4x1024 network, which is the largest network considered by Paulsen
et al. [33]. In contrast, since the smaller networks, namely 3x100
and 2x512 networks, were handled easily by both tools, we omit
their results. In the MNIST-related verification tasks, the goal is to
verify ϵ = 1 for the given input region. We consider the two types of
input regions from the previous work, namely global perturbations
and targeted pixel perturbations, however we use input regions
that are hundreds of orders of magnitude larger.
First, we look at the global perturbation. For these, the input
space is created by taking an input image and then allowing a per-
turbation of +/- p greyscale units to all of its pixels. In the previous
work, the largest perturbation was p = 3. Figure 11 compares Neu-
roDiff and ReluDiff+ on p = 3 all the way up to 8, where the
x-axis is the perturbation applied, and the y-axis is the percentage
of verification tasks (out of 100) that each can handle.
The results show that NeuroDiff can handle perturbations up
to +/- 6 units, whereas ReluDiff+ begins to struggle at 4. While the
difference between 4 and 6, may seem small, the volume of input
space for a perturbation of 6 is 6784/4784 ≈ 1.1 × 10138 times larger
than 4, or in other words, 138 orders of magnitude larger.
Next, we show a comparison of the epsilon verified by a single
forward pass for a perturbation of 8 on the MNIST 4x1024 network
in Figure 12. Points above the blue line indicate NeuroDiff per-
formed better. Overall, NeuroDiff is between two and three times
more accurate than ReluDiff+.
Finally, we look at the targeted pixel perturbation properties.
For these, the input space is created by taking an image, randomly
choosing n pixels, and setting there bounds to [0, 255], i.e., allowing
arbitrary changes to the chosen pixels. We again use the 4x1024
MNIST network. The results are summarized in Table 3. The first
column shows the number of randomly perturbed pixels. We can
again see very large speedups, and a significant increase in the size
of the input region that NeuroDiff can handle.
5.3.4 Contribution of Each Technique. Here, we analyze the con-
tribution of individual techniques, namely convex approximations
and symbolic variables, to the overall performance improvement.
In Table 4, we present the average ϵ that was able to be verified
after a single forward pass on the 4x1024 MNIST network for each
of the four techniques: ReluDiff+ (baseline), NeuroDiff with
Table 3: Results of the MNIST 4x1024 pixel experiment.
Num.
Pixels
NeuroDiff (new) ReluDiff+ Speedupproved undet. time (s) proved undet. time (s)
15 100 0 236.5 100 0 1610.2 6.8
18 100 0 540.8 88 12 34505.8 63.8
21 100 0 1004.0 30 70 145064.5 144.5
24 99 1 7860.1 1 99 179715.9 22.9
27 83 17 49824.0 0 100 180000.0 3.6
Table 4: Evaluating the individual contributions of convex
approximation and symbolic variables using the MNIST
4x1024 global perturbation experiment.
Perturb Average ϵ VerifiedReluDiff+ Conv. Approx. Int. Vars. NeuroDiff
3 0.59 0.42 (+1.39x) 0.43 (+1.38x) 0.20 (+2.93x)
4 1.02 0.70 (+1.46x) 0.87 (+1.18x) 0.36 (+2.85x)
5 1.60 1.06 (+1.52x) 1.47 (+1.09x) 0.56 (+2.87x)
6 2.29 1.47 (+1.55x) 2.19 (+1.04x) 0.79 (+2.90x)
7 3.02 1.92 (+1.58x) 2.96 (+1.02x) 1.04 (+2.91x)
8 3.80 2.39 (+1.59x) 3.77 (+1.01x) 1.30 (+2.93x)
only convex approximations, NeuroDiff with only intermediate
variables, and the full NeuroDiff.
Overall, the individual benefits of the two proposed approxima-
tion techniques are obvious. While convex approximation (alone)
consistently provides benefit as perturbation increases, the ben-
efit of symbolic variables (alone) tends to decrease. In addition,
combining the two provides much greater benefit than the sum of
their individual contributions. With perturbation of 8, for example,
convex approximations alone are 1.59 times more accurate than
ReluDiff+, and intermediate variables alone are 1.01 times more
accurate. However, together they are 2.93 times more accurate.
The results suggest two things. First, intermediate symbolic vari-
ables perform well when a significant portion of the network is
already in the stable state. We confirm, by manually inspecting the
experimental results, that it is indeed the case when we use a per-
turbation of 3 and 8 in the MNIST experiments. Second, the convex
approximations provide the most benefit when the pre-ReLU delta
intervals are (1) significantly wide, and (2) still contain a significant
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amount of symbolic information. This is also confirmed by man-
ually inspecting our MNIST results: increasing the perturbation
increases the overall width of the delta intervals.
6 RELATEDWORK
Aside from ReluDiff [33], the most closely related to our work
are those that focus on verifying properties of single networks as
opposed to two or more networks. These verification approaches
can be broadly categorized into those that use exact, constraint
solving-based techniques and those that use approximations.
On the constraint solving side, several works have adapted off-
the-shelf solvers [2–4, 7, 45], or even implemented solvers specif-
ically for neural networks [17, 18]. On the approximation side,
many use techniques that fit into the framework of abstract inter-
pretation [5]. For example, many works have leveraged abstract
domains such as intervals [16, 48, 49, 54], polyhedra [39, 40], and
zonotopes [9, 41].
In addition, these verification techniques have also been com-
bined [15, 41, 47], or entirely different approaches [6, 12, 38], such as
bounding a network’s lipschitz constant, have been studied. These
verification techniques can also be integrated into the training
process to produce more robust and easier to verify networks [8,
25, 26, 50]. These works are orthogonal, though we believe their
techniques can be adapted to our domain.
A related but tangential line of work focuses on discovering
interesting behaviors of neural networks, though without any guar-
antees. Most closely related to our work are differential testing
techniques [23, 34, 52], which focus on finding disagreements be-
tween a set of networks. However, these techniques do not attempt
to prove the equivalence or similarity of multiple networks.
Other works are more geared towards single network testing,
and use white-box testing techniques [22, 31, 42, 44, 51], such as
neuron coverage statistics, to assess how well a network has been
tested, and also report interesting behaviors. Both of these can be
thought of as adapting software engineering techniques to machine
learning.
In addition, many works use machine learning techniques, such
as gradient optimization, to find interesting behaviors, such as
adversarial examples[19, 24, 28, 29, 53]. These interesting behaviors
can then be used to retrain the network to improve robustness [11,
36]. Again, these techniques do not provide guarantees, though we
believe they could be integrated into NeuroDiff to quickly find
counterexamples.
Finally, our work draws inspiration from classic software en-
gineering techniques, such as regression testing [37], differential
assertion checking [20], differential fuzzing [30], and incremental
symbolic execution [13, 35], where one version of a program is used
as an “oracle”, to more efficiently test or verify a new version of the
same program. In our case, f can be thought of as the oracle, while
f ′ is the new version.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented NeuroDiff, a scalable differential verification
technique for soundly bounding the difference between two feed-
forward neural networks. NeuroDiff leverages novel convex ap-
proximations, which reduce the overall approximation error, and
intermediate symbolic variables, which control the error explosion,
to significantly improve efficiency and accuracy of the analysis.
Our experimental evaluation shows that NeuroDiff can achieve
up to 1000X speedup and is up to five times as accurate.
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